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76 I d. at 527. 
77 In this case, the waiting time was two steps removed from the productive 
activity on the assembly line and is therefore not "integral and 
indispensable" to a "principal activity." 
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FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF FACULTY AND 





Assume a faculty member at a public college is 
reprimanded by her department chair for the following reasons: 
she is told that her explanations to her students are unclear. In 
a recent class she taught, she gave 13 incompletes. When 
students approach her about making up the incomplete, she 
does not explain how to successfully complete the course. The 
students complain to her chair and she is given a reprimand and 
eventually not re-hired. 
The faculty member sues the college. She alleges 
infringement of her rights to free speech and academic freedom 
"in retaliation for her refusal to comply with a request that she 
communicate more clearly to her students what was required to 
complete the coursework in a class she taught in the fall of 
2000."1 
*Professor, Legal Studies, Ithaca College, School of Business 
**Associate Professor of Finance, Ithaca College, School of 
Business 
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Is this the sort of issue that the framers of the Constitution 
envisioned when they approved the Bill of Rights? Faculty 
members often assert that they "have First Amendment rights" 
yet few agree on exactly what those rights are. While there is a 
consistently held belief that discussions in the classroom are 
protected, do those rights encompass the "right not to explain 
class material;" or the "right to have personal discussions"? 
And what of the students' rights? Does the First Amendment 
mean that students can "say anything they want" in the name of 
academic freedom? And do faculty have a right to remove a 
student from a classroom if they find the students' speech 
disturbing or upsetting? 
The purpose of this paper is to examine issues of free 
speech as they apply in the classroom. It will examine these 
issues both as they pertain to statements by faculty in the 
classroom, for which they receive some form of "punishment" 
as well as statements or actions by students. 
PART I. FACULTY FREE SPEECH AT PUBLIC 
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 
Historically, courts have held that at a public college or 
university, "faculty may not be terminated for the content of 
their classroom speech, so long as it is consistent with the 
purpose of the course."2 The rationale is that an institution 
cannot limit a public faculty member's right to speech, or 
terminate a faculty appointment for speech expressed in the 
context of the citizen role or about a public issue. "3 Language, 
however, is not protected if, "taken in context, it constitute[s] a 
deliberate, superfluous attack on a 'captive audience' with no 
academic purpose or justification."4 The First Amendment 
does not protect public college faculty in vulgar and profane 
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speech where the words are not "germane to the subject 
matter" or m violation of the college's sexual harassment 
policy.5 
In the seminal case of Pickering v. Board of Education, 6 
the Supreme Court ruled that school board officials in Will 
County, Illinois, violated the First Amendment rights of a 
public high school teacher when they fired him for writing a 
letter to the editor of the local newspaper criticizing the board 
of education for its allocation of school funds between athletics 
and education. The Court ruled that "[i]n determining a public 
employee's rights of free speech, the problem is to arrive "at a 
balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in 
commenting on matters of public concern and the interest of 
the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the 
public services it performs through its employees."7 "Whether 
a public employee's speech addresses a matter of public 
concern," so as to protect an employee from termination for 
expressing those views "must be determined by content, form 
and the context of a given statement."8 
There are deeply ingrained societal reasons for protecting 
faculty speech. Justice Brennan noted in Keyishian v. Board of 
Regents, 9 "Our nation is deeply committed to safeguarding 
academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us 
and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is 
therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which 
does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the 
classroom. The classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of 
ideas. '" 10 He warned how dangerous it would be to "impose 
any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges 
and universities."1 "The nation's future depends upon leaders 
trained through wide exposure to the robust exchange of ideas 
which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of [rather] 
than through any kind of authoritative selection."' 2 
2007 I First Amendment Rights I 88 
Free speech in the classroom is not unfettered. Like any 
public employee, the courts analyzing the dismissal of 
at public colleges and universities employ a four part test m 
determining whether that dismissal is protected speech. 
"The first step is to determine whether the speech 
is protected, i.e., on a matter of public concern. If 
so the second step is to balance the employee's 
in;erest in commenting on matters of public 
concern against the government employer's 
interest in promoting efficient government 
services. If that balance is struck in favor of the 
employee's interest, the third step requires the 
employee to demonstrate that his speech was a 
substantial or motivating factor in the adverse 
employment action. If the employee so 
demonstrates, the fourth step considers whether 
the government employer has proven that it 
have taken the same adverse employment actiOn, 
even in the absence of the protected speech. The 
first two steps are legal questions which the court 
resolves to determine whether the speech is 
constitutionally protected. The second two steps 
concern causation and involve questions of 
fact."13 
Is the speech a matter of public concern? 
The courts differentiate between speech that is personal 
in nature, and thus unprotected, versus that is matter 
of public concern and thus protected. What a 
matter of public concern is generally related to a pohtlcal, 
f · "
15 ·ated social or other matter o commumty concern, as enunc1 
in Connick v. Meyers. 16 Here, the respondent, an Assistant 
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District Attorney, was informed that she would be transferred 
to a different section of the criminal court to prosecute cases. 
She strongly opposed the transfer and distributed a 
questionnaire around the District Attorney's office. She was 
terminated for refusing to accept the transfer and told that the 
distribution of the questionnaire was an act of insubordination. 
The court found that this was not a matter of public concern. 
"Myers did not seek to inform the public that the District 
Attorney's office was not discharging its governmental 
responsibilities in the investigation and prosecution of criminal 
cases. Nor did Myers seek to bring to light actual or potential 
wrongdoing or breach of public trust on the part of Connick 
and others. Indeed, the questionnaire, if released to the public, 
would convey no information at all other than the fact that a 
single employee is upset with the status quo. 17 The Court 
recognized that an assistant district attorney's speech related to 
official pressure to work on a campaign was a matter of public 
concern because it was "a matter of interest to the community 
upon which it is essential that public employees be able to 
speak out freely without fear of retaliatory dismissal."18 
Speech, however, that deals with 'individual personnel disputes 
and grievances' and that would be of 'no relevance to the 
public's evaluation of the performance of governmental 
agencies' is generally not of'public concem' ."19 
Other protected speech can be characterized as that which 
serves a purpose, such as speech which "discloses any evidence 
of corruption, impropriety, or other malfeasance on the part of 
[state] officials, in terms of content, clearly concerns matters of 
public import " 20 in comparison to speech that is "calculated to 
redress personal grievances." 21 
Hulen v. Yatei2 involved a dysfunctional accounting 
department at Colorado State University (CSU). The 
department was fraught with in-fighting and accusations of 
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unethical behavior. The plaintiff "cooperated with other 
members of the Accounting Department in seeking to revoke 
the tenure of a colleague (Dr. William Mister) on grounds of 
plagiarism and copyright violations, emotional abuse of 
students abuse and harassment of staff, misuse of state funds, ' . receipt of kickbacks from a Eublisher in return for 
textbooks, and other charges" 3. Hulen "attempted to bnng his 
concerns to the CSU Administration. He wrote memos to the 
provost about the lack of an investigation, and made statements 
about unethical behavior that he perceived going on in the 
department.24 In one memorandum, he wrote, "Yet the very 
cornerstone of our profession of accounting involves ethical 
behavior and integrity. We cannot successfully teach ethics if 
it is not practiced at CSU."25 The administration asked Dr. 
Hulen to stop its investigation of Dr. Mister. When he refused, 
Dr. Hulen was removed from the accounting department and 
placed in the management department, in which not 
qualified to teach any courses, "thereby resultmg m. a 
diminished ability to attract research funds, publish 
scholarship, receive salary increases, teach summer tax classes, 
and obtain reimbursement for professional dues and journal 
b . . ,26 su scnpt10ns. 
The court found that this was exactly the type of speech 
worth protecting. "The speech in this case fairly relates to 
charges at a public university that plainly would be of interest 
to the public. "[T]eachers whose speech directly affects the 
public's perception of the quality of education in a 
academic system find their speech protected [under the First 
Amendment]. "27 
Many times the action of the professor is mixed with 
some protected and some non-protected activities. For 
example, in Blum v. Schlege/,28 a law school professor wrote 
letters to his fellow faculty members relating to his quest for 
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tenure and promotion, and a letter making suggestions about 
school policy and curriculum. The letters regarding the 
professor's particular status for tenure and promotion were held 
not to "relate in any way to any political, social or other matter 
of community concern .... Moreover, many of these letters make 
clear that plaintiff was writing merely as a disgruntled 
employee complaining of a personal employment dispute. "29 
In Hudson v Craven,30 an economics professor at Clark 
College encouraged her students, as part of a class assignment, 
to attend the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
meetings/protests in Seattle. These protests were highly 
publicized in the area and attracted international attention. 
When the college learned of her plans to take the students to a 
potentially dangerous event, the college admonished her that 
she could not do so. She sued, claiming that her First 
Amendment rights were violated, but the court disagreed. 
"While Hudson's freedom to participate in discussion about the 
WTO surely implicates core political speech, the actual 
curtailment of her First Amendment rights was minimal. 
Hudson was free to attend the anti-WTO rally on her own. She 
was free to communicate her views on the WTO to her students 
or to anyone else. She was free to associate with her students in 
the classroom on this matter. The only claimed abridgement of 
her First Amendment rights was that she was not permitted, 
under the de facto auspices of the College, to associate with a 
handful of students during a discrete event for a limited 
duration. "31 
This case is an excellent example of when the "legitimate 
administrative interests of Clark College" strongly outweighed 
the professor's associational interests. The court also espoused 
language helpful in determining when faculty 's first 
amendment rights can be legitimately curtailed. These include: 




risks to students, particularly an underage group, 
and potential liability for the college, because of the 
reports of potential for violence; 
students who were not able to attend would not 
have the benefit of access and networking with 
teachers; 
mixing one's politics with one's professional 
responsibility in the classroom, which is a special 
trust; [and] (4) marginal benefit from participating 
in the demonstration.32 
The court found that, "This litany boils down to two 
reasons: student safety and pedagogical oversight. While some 
of these justifications are more significant than others, on 
balance the legitimate interests of Clark College as an 
employer and educational institution outweigh those of Hudson 
to participate in the de facto field trip with her students."33 
Clark College met its burden by demonstrating that its 
legitimate interests outweighed Hudson's interest in attending 
the anti-WTO rally with her students. 
Was the speech a substantial or motivating factor? 
The plaintiffs second hurdle is proving that the speech 
was a "substantial or motivating factor" in the employment 
decision. In de Llano v. Berglund/4 a faculty member criticized 
numerous administrative decisions including rising salaries of 
administrators and poor spending policies of administrators. 
The plaintiff met the first requirement, that the issue be one of 
public concern, but he failed to satisfy the second requirement. 
He could not prove that his speech is what caused his 
dismissal. The court stated that, "We are unable to ascertain 
any evidence that he was terminated because of the letters he 
wrote to the various venues. The dismissal notice given to de 
Llano outlines a number of reasons for his termination and 
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those reasons were substantiated in two separate hearings. Not 
one of the reasons stated for his termination related to de 
Llano's letters. The fact that de Llano publicly criticized 
college administrators, and that some of the criticism is 
constitutionally protected, is insufficient to carry his burden of 
establishing that the letters were a substantial factor in the 
termination decision."35 The unfortunate reality of this case is 
that the review boards or administrators hearing these types of 
complaints can choose their words carefully. By not stating that 
any of the reasons for dismissal are due to the exercise of 
speech, the plaintiff will have a difficult time prevailing on the 
issue of causation. 
Since the Pickering decision, the Supreme Court has 
significantly modified its analysis of first amendment rights of 
civil or public employees which are applicable, therefore, to 
faculty employed at public institutions. In Waters v. 
Churchill, 36 the plaintiff, a nurse, complained to others in the 
hospital about co-workers as well as the running of the 
hospital. Ultimately, she was fired and she sued claiming her 
speech was both protected and non-disruptive. Here, the court 
stated that the right to speak is also limited if it may cause 
disruption, not if it actually did. "Whittled to its core, Waters 
permits a government employer to fire an employee for 
speaking on a matter of public concern if: (1) the employer's 
prediction of disruption is reasonable; (2) the potential 
disruptiveness is enough to outweigh the value of the speech; 
and (3) the employer took action against the employee based 
on this disruption and not in retaliation for the speech. 37 In 
addition, when weighing the value of the employee's speech 
against the interference with government operations, the 
Waters plurality also indicated that a government employer 
need only show that the speech is likely to be disruptive before 
the speaker may be punished. 38 
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39 h fi . In Jeffries v. Harleston one oft e ew cases to mterpret 
Waters, the plaintiff, was the chairman of the Black Studies 
department at CUNY. In delivering a speech he made 
derogatory statements about the public school curriculum, Jews 
and the history of black oppression. As a result, the CUNY 
Board of Trustees voted to reduce his chairmanship from three 
to one year. Jeffries sued, claiming that his demotion was based 
on the speech, and thus protected. 
But the court, applying the criteria set forth in Waters, 
disagreed. The court held that the defendants did not violate 
Jeffries' free speech rights if: (1) it was reasonable for them to 
believe that the Albany speech would disrupt CUNY 
operations; (2) the potential interference with CUNY 
operations outweighed the First Amendment value of the 
Albany speech; and (3) they demoted Jeffries because they 
feared the ramifications for CUNY, or, at least, for reasons 
wholly unrelated to the Albany speech. 40 Because there was a 
potential for disruption, the court found, that, as a matter of 
law, this potential disruptiveness was enough to outweigh 
whatever First Amendment value the Albany speech might 
have had. 
There is also a clear line of cases involving faculty 
members engaged in inappropriate language and/or behavior as 
unprotected activity. For example, suppose that a professor 
uses profanity in the classroom. In spite of warnings from the 
dean, the instructor continued to make derogatory statements 
towards his students about their attitude in his class, some of 
which included the words "hell," "damn," "bullshit," and 
"sucks."41 After two students filed written complaints 
concerning the professor' s speech, the dean initiated action, 
approved by the board of trustees, to terminate the appellant. 
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The appellant argued that his language was not obscene, 
and that he had been exercising his First Amendment right to 
use profane language. Furthermore, he argued that his First 
Amendment right to "academic freedom" permitted such 
language. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's 
decision that a publicly employed college teacher is not 
constitutionally protected in the offensive use of profanity in 
the classroom. In fact, the court found that professors hold a 
unique position. "We view the role of higher education as no 
less pivotal to our national interest. It carries on the process of 
instilling in our citizens necessary democratic virtues, among 
which are civility and moderation. It is necessary to the nurture 
of knowledge and resourcefulness that undergird our economic 
and political system. Repeated failure by a member of the 
educational staff of Midland College to exhibit professionalism 
degrades his important mission and detracts from the subjects 
he is trying to teach. '.42 
Furthermore, "there was no doubt that the appellant's 
outbursts did not address a matter of public concem."43 As 
previously stated, the indecent language appellant used 
described his attitude toward his students, "hardly a matter 
that .... would occasion public discussion." The Court ruled that 
the "appellant has not argued that his profanity was for any 
purpose other than cussing out his students as an expression of 
frustration with their progress- to 'motivate' them- and has 
thereby impliedly conceded his case under Connick. ' .44 
In Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 45 the plaintiff was suspended for 
his use of vulgar and profane language in his literature class. 
He filed a suit against the president of Macomb Community 
College alleging, among other things, that his freedom of 
speech was violated. College officials met with the plaintiff 
who defended his use of the language by stating that it was 
used to highlight the "'chauvinistic degrading attitudes in 
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society that depict women as sexual objects, as compared to 
certain words to describe male genitalia, which are not taboo or 
considered to be deliberately intended to degrade. ' "46 After the 
meeting, the College gave the plaintiff a written warning that 
stated in part: 
Unless germane to discussion of appropriate 
course materials and thus a constitutionally 
protect act of academic freedom, your utterance 
in the classroom of such words as 'f**k,' 'c**t' 
and 'p***y' may serve as a reasonable basis for 
concluding as a matter of law that you are 
fostering a learning environment hostile to 
women."47 
After subsequent complaints of vulgar and profane 
language in class, the College reprimanded and then suspended 
the plaintiff for a period of time. The Court concluded that the 
plaintiff had no constitutionally protected right to use vulgar 
and profane language in his English composition class because 
it was "not germane to the subject matter." 48 The court stated 
that "Plaintiff may have a constitutional right to use words such 
as "p***y," "c**t," and "f**k," but he does not have a 
constitutional right to use them in a classroom setting where 
they are not germane to the subject matter, in contravention of 
the College's sexual harassment policy."49 The Court remarked 
that, "[w]hile a professor's right to academic freedom and 
freedom of expression are paramount in the academic setting, 
they are not absolute to the point of compromising a student's 
right to learn in a hostile-free environment."50 
In a subsequent case, the plaintiffs gratuitous use of in-
class vulgarity was distinguished from speech that, while 
offensive to some was germane to the course material and , 51 
therefore protected by the First Amendment. The instructor 
97 I Vol. 18 I North East Journal of Legal Studies 
had given a lecture about language and social constructivism in 
order to show students the way in which language is used to 
marginalize minorities and other oppressed groups of society. 52 
The students were then engaged in a classroom discussion 
analyzing the effect of oppressive and demeaning words such 
as "n*****r" and "b***h."53 Subsequently, one of the 
instructor's African-American students complained to her 
minister, a local civil-rights activist, who, in tum threatened the 
school with a decline in African-American enrollment if the 
dispute was not resolved in the student' s favor. The President 
and Dean obliged, and the instructor's teaching contract was 
not renewed. 
The court held that the use of "socially controversial 
words," along with "racial and gender epithets in an academic 
context designed to analyze the impact of these words upon 
societal relations, touched upon a matter of public concern and 
thus fell within the First Amendment's protection."54 
Furthermore, the court ruled that "speech on public issues 
occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment 
values, and is entitled to special protection." 55 In addition, the 
teacher's actions did not have an impact on the governance or 
operation of the school, thus satisfying the balancing tests other 
prong. 
What about a faculty member who makes off color jokes; 
uses sexual innuendo around students and makes comments 
such as "he wanted to "get his hands" on one graduate student 
and "get naked" or "drink some good beer" with another? 
These statements by a non-tenured probationary faculty 
member were held to be in the faculty member's personal 
interest. "The statements were simply parts of a calculated type 
of speech designed to further Trejo's private interests in 
attempting to solicit female companionship and, at the same 
time, possibly to irritate the other graduate students to whom 
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he was speaking." 56 As such they were completely 
unprotected by the First Amendment and the actions taken 
against him by the administration were upheld. 
PART II. STUDENT FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS. 
The rights of students in the classroom was enunciated in 
the seminal case Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School Dist. 57 Set during the political turmoil of the 1960's, 
Tinker involved high school students suspended from school 
for wearing black arm bands. The court set out a balancing test 
to be employed in instances when First Amendment rights 
clash with the need to maintain order in schools. In the now 
famous pronouncement, the court stated, "It can hardly be 
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional 
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse 
gate. This has been the unmistakable holding of this Court for 
almost 50 years."58 
On the other hand, it is equally important for schools to 
maintain order in the schools if for no other reason than the 
safety of the students. Therefore, the courts also acknowledge 
the need to allow schools "to prescribe and control conduct in 
the schools." 59 
A classic example of the court's reasoning is evidenced in 
Salehpour v. University of Tennessee 60 Here, a dental student 
refused to follow the professor's classroom rule 'barring first-
year dental students from sitting in the last row of their 
classrooms. ' On one particular day, the professor asked the 
student to move in the presence of a guest lecturer. "Plaintiff 
replied that he was comfortable where he was sitting and did 
not wish to move. Dr. Fletcher informed Plaintiff that if he did 
not move to another seat, he would have to leave the class." 61 
The lawsuit that ensued included allegations "that he was 
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discriminated against because of his national origin, physical 
disability, and protest against the classroom rule prohibiting 
first-year dental students from sitting in the last row of certain 
classes." 62 
Citing Tinker, the court noted that, "conduct by the 
student, in class or out of it, which for any reason--whether it 
stems from time, place, or type of behavior--materially disrupts 
class work or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the 
rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the 
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech." As such, we 
find that, here, Plaintiffs claim fails at the inception where his 
alleged speech, i.e., his conduct of disrupting the classroom 
milieu for the sole purpose of advancing and pursuing his 
admitted "power struggle" with the University, was not 
protected activity. 63 
It is interesting to note that few cases exist that examine 
the tension between faculty and students in the classroom. In 
Brown v. Li, 64however, the court acknowledged that neither 
the courts or the parties had found any Supreme Court case 
discussing the appropriate standard for reviewing a university's 
regulation of students' curricular speech 
As a general rule, however, the court found that United 
States Supreme Court sentiment that "the curriculum of a 
public educational institution is one means by which the 
institution itself expresses its policy, a policy with which others 
do not have a constitutional right to interfere."65 Therefore, 
when the student submitted his thesis and attached to it a 
"Disacknowledgment" which began "I would like to offer 
special F*** You's to the following degenerates for being an 
ever-present hindrance during my graduate career····" It then 
identified the Dean and staff of the graduate school, the 
managers of Davidson Library, former California Governor 
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Wilson, the Regents of the University of California, and 
"Science" as having been particularly obstructive to Plaintiffs 
progress toward his graduate degree. The dean then wrote a 
letter to Plaintiff, informing him that his degree would be 
conferred upon the approval of his thesis. The letter further 
noted that approval would be forthcoming as soon as Plaintiff 
removed his "Disacknowledgements."66 
The court found that no First Amendment violation 
existed but rather this was a clear pedagogical decision by the 
university and the university set the standard. 
. . . Plaintiffs thesis was subject to a reviewing 
committee's reasonable regulation. Plaintiff was 
given reasonable standards for that assignment, 
including a pedagogically appropriate 
requirement that the thesis comply with 
professional standards governing his discipline. 
He was instructed that he should consult a 
standard style manual, or talk with members of 
his committee, about those 
requirements ... Plaintiffs committee members 
acted well within their discretion, and in 
conformity with the First Amendment, when they 
declined to approve the noncompliant section. 
Their decision was reasonably related to a 
legitimate pedagogical objective: teaching 
Plaintiff the proper format for a scientific paper. 
With few cases to rely upon to answer questions 
regarding classroom behavior at the college and university 
level, this case contains especially helpful language. 
What if the first amendment rights are 
by an in-classroom act1v1ty? In Axson-Flynn v. Johnson a 
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student in the University of Utah's actor training program and a 
devout Mormon argued that making her say the "F" word as 
part of a script violated her religious beliefs. As a result, she 
dropped out of the program and then sued for deprivation of 
her civil rights. 
The court found that as long as there was a relationship 
between the pedagogy and the goals of the course, then the 
language was justified. "The school's methodology may not be 
necessary to the achievement of its goals and it may not even 
be the most effective means of teaching, but it can still be 
"reasonably related" to pedagogical concerns. A more stringent 
standard would effectively give each student veto power over 
curricular requirements, subjecting the curricular decisions of 
teachers to the whims of what a particular student does or does 
not feel like learning on a given day. This we decline to do."68 
Nevertheless, the court wondered if the use of such 
language was in fact a pretext to discriminate against her on the 
basis of religion, or an 'anti- Mormon sentiment.' "Viewing the 
evidence in a light most favorable to Axson-Flynn, we find that 
there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
Defendants' justification for the script adherence requirement 
was truly pedagogical or whether it was a pretext for religious 
discrimination"69 thereby reversing and remanding the decision 
for further deliberation. 
CONCLUSION 
The foregoing review of the case law on faculty and 
student first amendment rights in the classroom provides some 
comforting safe havens and guidelines, but it also indicates a 
disconcerting undercurrent of subjectivity that may undermine 
free speech in academia. It seems reasonable that both faculty 
and students have no right to engage in gratuitous profanity in 
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the classroom, that a modicum of decorum should be 
maintained. Nor should faculty require students to participate 
in potentially dangerous demonstrations in furtherance of their 
own political viewpoints. But some faculty, particularly those 
not tenured, may abridge their speech for fear of reprisals. 
After Hudson, would a professor be at risk is she encouraged 
her students to become informed citizens and to engage in 
participatory democracy by checking out the campus sit-in? 
And after Bonnell, should speech, media, language, and 
English professors refrain from the study of inflammatory 
Literature for fear that some may take offense? Perhaps most 
disturbing is the courts willingness in Axson-Flynn to allow a 
jury to review a script to determine if the use of a swear word 
was actually a pretext for religious discrimination. If the 
university is to remain Justice Brennan's ideal "marketplace of 
ideas", it cannot be pre-sanitized. 
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THEY EAT HORSES, DON'T THEY? 




"The measure of a society is how well it treats its animals. "1 
Barbara Righton 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Congress has historically exhibited a significant interest 
in the welfare of the nation's horses. The recent debate over 
attempts to end the slaughtering of horses in the United States 
that are exported for consumption to Europe and Japan has 
ended at least temporarily, in a modem coup d ' e'tat pitting 
Congress and numerous animal welfare groups, against the 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDAl The losers 
unfortunately, in this ongoing battle of wills are the 80,000 
horses slated for slaughter at three U.S. slaughterhouses which 
continue in operation despite the clear intent of Congress. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The horse has a long and intimate history with mankind 
in general and in particular with the development of the 
Americas. The Western Hemisphere had not seen horses since 
the end of the Ice Age (circa 10,000 B.C.). Christopher 
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